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From the Failure of Desegregation to the  
Failure of Choice 
Wendy Parker  
ABSTRACT 
As we commemorate the fortieth anniversary of the St. Louis 
school desegregation litigation, a natural question is how current 
education reform efforts impact the status of and potential for school 
integration. This Article examines how the push for school choice 
impacts school desegregation in Missouri specifically and the United 
States generally. The evidence reveals that while our student 
population is becoming more diverse and the prevalence of all-white 
schools is diminishing, the pattern of high-poverty, high-minority, 
low-performing schools persists. Charter schools—the most common 
form of school choice—actually exacerbate the segregation of poor 
and minority school children. As a first step in rectifying the 
segregative impact of charter schools, this Article proposes that the 
federal government require more inclusionary practices by charter 
schools for states to receive federal funding for their charter schools. 
Otherwise, we once again allow current reform efforts to continue 
our history of segregated, unequal schooling.  
 
 
 Wendy Parker, James A. Webster Professor of Public Law, Wake Forest University 
School of Law. I am grateful for the invitation from Professor Kimberly Jade Norwood to 
participate in this symposium. I am also extremely thankful for the outstanding research 
assistance of Jason Weber and the helpful comments of Cedric Powell and Leland Ware.  
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INTRODUCTION 
School desegregation once promised to transform us into a 
country of equality through the power of integration. When Minnie 
Liddell and others filed Liddell v. Board of Education forty years ago 
in 1972, surely they felt great hope for integrated schooling,
1
 even if 
 
 1. See generally Robert W. Tabscott, Minnie Liddell’s Quest, ST. LOUIS BEACON (Sept. 
29, 2009), https://www.stlbeacon.org/#!/content/20621/minnie_liddells_quest. 
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that hope was tempered with understandable frustration with their 
school district.
2
 Missouri, which by constitution and statute had once 
segregated its schools,
3
 was a relative latecomer to school 
desegregation, but its two school desegregation cases had great 
potential.
4
 Plaintiffs in both Kansas City and St. Louis had partial, but 
remarkable, success in avoiding the Supreme Court’s restrictions on 
interdistrict remedies.
5
 Both took novel and expensive approaches to 
promoting actual integration in their cities and surrounding suburban 
school districts.
6
  
 
 2. For example, in the 1972–73 school year, 148 of the city’s 181 elementary and high 
schools were at least 90 percent of one race. See Liddell v. Bd. of Educ., 469 F. Supp. 1304, 
1329 (E.D. Mo. 1979), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Adams v. United States, 620 F.2d 1277 
(8th Cir. 1980). The city’s school district had experienced a dramatic transformation that began 
even before Brown v. Board of Education. Its white student population declined significantly 
between 1953 and 1963, while the overall student population increased dramatically. See id. at 
1328–29. 
 3. See id. at 1313. 
 4. The Kansas City suit was not filed until 1974. See Sch. Dist. v. State, 460 F. Supp. 
421, 427 (W.D. Mo. 1978) (noting that the Kansas City case was originally filed by the Kansas 
City, Missouri School District (KCMSD), along with a class represented by four minor children 
of KCMSD school board members, against thirty-five metropolitan area school districts and 
other defendants from the States of Missouri and Kansas and the federal government), appeal 
dismissed on jurisdictional grounds, 592 F.2d 493 (8th Cir. 1979); see also Liddell, 469 F. 
Supp. at 1309 (detailing the individual plaintiffs and their suit in 1972 against the St. Louis City 
school district, the State of Missouri, and various officers of those political subdivisions). 
 5. See Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken I), 418 U.S. 717, 741, 745 (1974). In Milliken I, the 
Supreme Court restricted the availability of interdistrict remedies. These limitations effectively 
confined remedies to the area within a single school district’s boundary lines. Twelve years 
after Liddell was filed, the Eastern District of Missouri and the 8th Circuit both approved an 
expansive interdistrict transfer program proposed in a settlement agreement developed by the 
plaintiffs and defendants. Although participation in the program was ―voluntary‖ for suburban 
school districts, those districts were threatened with court sanctions if they did not volunteer 
and meet the plan’s requirements. The program was strongly successful for those city students 
able to secure one of the program’s limited transfer opportunities. See generally Liddell v. 
Missouri (Liddell VII), 731 F.2d 1294, 1298, 1302 (8th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (generally 
approving settlement agreement establishing a voluntary, interdistrict transfer program and St. 
Louis magnet schools). For the positive impact of the transfer program and magnet schools on 
student achievement, see JAMES E. RYAN, FIVE MILES AWAY, A WORLD APART 195–96 
(2010). Kansas City embarked on an expensive quest to improve its schools, in part, to create 
―suburban comparability‖ and thereby to attract white, suburban students. Attracting suburban 
students into KCMSD proved largely illusive, and the Supreme Court ultimately deemed 
suburban comparability an impermissible remedial goal. See generally Missouri v. Jenkins 
(Jenkins III), 515 U.S. 70, 90–91 (1995). 
 6. For an interesting history of the negotiations that led to the St. Louis voluntary 
interdistrict plan, see D. Bruce La Pierre, Voluntary Interdistrict School Desegregation in St. 
Louis: The Special Master’s Tale, 1987 WIS. L. REV. 971 (1987). For an examination of the 
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Yet, both cases amply demonstrate the difficulties of actualizing 
the transformative power of Brown v. Board of Education.
7
 The 
Kansas City and St. Louis desegregation cases are now officially 
completed,
8
 but integration and educational success have largely 
eluded both school districts. Extreme segregation persists in both 
school districts,
9
 and both have lost their state accreditation.
10
  
Today we rarely expect or hope for integrated schools.
11
 School 
desegregation litigation is all but over,
12
 and our schools too often 
 
interdistrict plan in Kansas City, ordered by the district court but substantially limited by the 
Supreme Court, see Wendy Parker, The Supreme Court and Public Law Remedies: A Tale of 
Two Kansas Cities, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 475, 492–95, 497–500, 503–06 (1999). 
 7. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 8. See Liddell v. Bd. of Educ., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132526 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 16, 2011) 
(memorandum and order approving a joint settlement agreement between the parties and 
retaining jurisdiction to enforce the agreement); Jenkins v. Kansas City, Mo. Sch. Dist., 516 
F.3d 1074, 1079 (8th Cir. 2008) (noting the declaration of unitary status in 2003 and amending 
the 2003 order). 
 9. For the 2011–12 school year, traditional public schools in the Kansas City School 
District enrolled 15,826 students and only 8.9 percent were white. See 2011 Kansas City 
District Report Card, MO. DEP’T OF ELEMENTARY & SECONDARY EDUC., http://mcds.dese.mo 
.gov/guidedinquiry/School%20Report%20Card/District%20Report%20Card.aspx?rp:SchoolYe
ar=2011&rp:SchoolYear=2010&rp:SchoolYear=2009&rp:SchoolYear=2008&rp:DistrictCode=
048078 (last modified Aug. 8, 2012). For the 2011–12 school year, traditional public schools in 
the St. Louis City school district enrolled 23,576 students and only 13.5 percent were white. See 
2011 St. Louis City District Report Card, MO. DEP’T OF ELEMENTARY & SECONDARY EDUC., 
http://mcds.dese.mo.gov/guidedinquiry/School%20Report%20Card/District%20Report%20Car
d.aspx?rp:SchoolYear=2011&rp:SchoolYear=2010&rp:SchoolYear=2009&rp:SchoolYear=200
8&rp:DistrictCode=115115 (last modified Aug. 9, 2012). In contrast, in 1953–54, before St. 
Louis began to lose its white student population to the suburbs, student enrollment in those 
schools was 89,475, and 65.5 percent of the students were white. See Liddell, 469 F. Supp. at 
1329.  
 10. See A. G. Sulzberger, Kansas City, Mo., School District Loses Its Accreditation, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 20, 2011, at A21; Malcolm Gay, State Takes Control of Troubled Public Schools 
in St. Louis, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2007, at A12.  
 11. Michelle Adams, Radical Integration, 94 CAL. L. REV. 261, 264 (2006) (―Integration 
no longer captivates the progressive imagination; it no longer moves those concerned with 
eliminating racial inequality.‖); Molly S. McUsic, The Future of Brown v. Board of Education: 
Economic Integration of the Public Schools, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1334, 1334 (2004) (concluding 
that ―the influence of Brown is thirty years past its peak‖); john a. powell, The Tensions 
Between Integration and School Reform, 28 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 655, 686 (2001) 
(―[I]ntegration no longer remains a primary or even secondary goal in education.‖); James E. 
Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money, 109 YALE L.J. 249, 251 (1999) (―It seems unfashionable 
these days, if not atavistic, to talk seriously about ways to increase racial integration.‖); James 
E. Ryan, The Supreme Court and Voluntary Integration, 121 HARV. L. REV. 131, 155 (2007) 
(―The rest of the country appears to have turned its back on integration.‖). 
 12. See Wendy Parker, The Decline of Judicial Decisionmaking: School Desegregation 
and District Court Judges, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1623, 1627–28 (2003); Wendy Parker, The Future 
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remain segregated.
13
 Yet, almost everyone still proclaims faith in the 
truth of Brown.
14
  
What explains this disconnect between the persistence of school 
segregation and the iconic status of Brown? At best, we are merely 
weary from the battle.
15
 More likely is that we have disconnected 
Brown from its transformative potential and relegated integration to 
the back of the bus as either impractical or unimportant. Other 
educational reforms capture our attention as more effective.  
This Article, written in the spirit of honoring Mrs. Liddell, who 
remained committed to integration throughout her life,
16
 explores the 
consequences of forgoing school integration in the context of charter 
schools. What I discover is deeply troubling. Charter schools, which 
are growing fast with broad political support, pursue excellence 
without concern for integration.
17
 This is true for both racial/ethnic 
and economic integration. Through the practice and design of charter 
schools, we have more segregation, not less, and only conflicting 
evidence of educational excellence. All the more disturbing is the use 
of public money to support this segregation.  
Part I reveals how the design of charter schools allows and 
facilitates segregation. Part II exposes how charter schools in practice 
exacerbate racial and economic segregation in Kansas City and St. 
Louis and throughout the United States. In practice, charter schools 
actually create fewer opportunities for integrated education than the 
 
of School Desegregation, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 1157, 1158–59, 1178–80 (2000). 
 13. See Wendy Parker, The Failure of Education Reform and the Promise of Integration, 
90 TEX. L. REV. 395, 419–21 (2011) [hereinafter Parker, The Failure of Education Reform]. 
 14. See, e.g., DERRICK BELL, SILENT COVENANTS 3 (2004) (describing Brown as the 
―equivalent of the Holy Grail of racial justice‖). 
 15. JONATHAN KOZOL, THE SHAME OF THE NATION: THE RESTORATION OF APARTHEID 
SCHOOLING IN AMERICA 240 (2005) (quoting Roger Wilkins’s contention that we are ―morally 
exhausted‖ with integration efforts). 
 16. Mrs. Liddell remained committed to integration until her death in 2004 at the age of 
sixty-four. See Dale Singer, Education Trends Could Jeopardize Gains Won by Liddell Case, 
Speakers Say, ST. LOUIS BEACON (Mar. 23, 2012) (quoting a statement made by Mrs. Liddell’s 
son, Michael, at a Washington University School of Law symposium on the status of 
desegregation efforts); see also Tabscott, supra note 1 (quoting Mrs. Liddell’s testimony at a 
1997 desegregation hearing: ―There is only one moral course—to provide all of our children 
quality, integrated education.‖). 
 17. I strongly disagree with this disconnect. Parker, The Failure of Education Reform, 
supra note 13, at 407–11; Wendy Parker, Desegregating Teachers, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 37–
40 (2008). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
122 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 40:117 
 
 
unconstitutional ―freedom of choice‖ plans did in the 1960s.18 Part III 
argues that federal policy must be changed to rectify the pattern of 
high-poverty, high-minority schools in Missouri and elsewhere. This 
year, the federal government will award hundreds of millions of 
dollars to charter schools—with no concern that the money will 
subsidize and increase segregation.  
That must change. Otherwise, we are publicly funding a pattern of 
high-poverty, high-minority schools, largely to the detriment of 
student success and our country’s future. 
I. CHOICE & CHARTER SCHOOLS 
This Part considers one of the most prominent educational reform 
efforts of the twenty-first century: choice.
19
 It specifically examines 
the national push for charter schools and how the State of Missouri 
promotes and limits the use of charter schools. When one carefully 
examines the design of charter schools, one discovers that the 
foundation of charter schools allows, and to a certain extent 
promotes, segregation. Like freedom-of-choice plans in the 1960s, 
charter schools today are designed not only to allow segregation, but 
to facilitate segregation.
20
 
A. Choice 
School choice is not new. The year after Brown, free-market 
economist Milton Friedman articulated his vision of public vouchers 
to cover private school tuition.
21
 White Southerners tried their best to 
continue segregation through a variety of choice mechanisms.
22
 
While many focus on the role of choice in fostering segregation, the 
 
 18. See Green v. Cnty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 437–38 (1968) (outlawing such plans as a 
desegregation remedy because of their ineffectiveness). 
 19. The other high-profile reform effort of the twenty-first century is accountability, most 
notably reflected in the federal No Child Left Behind Act, discussed briefly infra Part III.A.2.  
 20. This connection to freedom-of-choice plans is discussed infra Part II.C. 
 21. See Milton Friedman, The Role of Government in Education, in ECONOMICS AND THE 
PUBLIC INTEREST 123 (Robert A. Solo ed., 1955). 
 22. See Wendy Parker, Connecting the Dots: Grutter, School Desegregation, and 
Federalism, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1691, 1709–14 (2004) [hereinafter Parker, Connecting 
the Dots]. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol40/iss1/4
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truth is that choice has been used both to thwart
23
 and to promote 
school desegregation.
24
 For example, civil rights activists used choice 
in opening Mississippi Freedom Schools during the Mississippi 
Freedom Summer of 1964.
25
 
What is new about choice is not its presence in school assignment. 
What is new about school choice is its formal disconnect with school 
integration. While in the past school choice was used by both 
advocates and opponents in the battle over school desegregation, 
today choice is completely disconnected from the value of 
desegregation, as if choice were neutral in promoting or discouraging 
integration or as if student demographics were of no concern.
26
  
B. Charter Schools 
1. Nationally 
The most available form of choice today is a charter school.
27
 
Starting with President Reagan, the Executive Branch has actively 
 
 23. For example, in the aftermath of Brown, some Southern school districts adopted 
―freedom-of-choice‖ plans that eliminated segregation by law and replaced it with segregation 
largely maintained by parental choice. See generally id. (detailing theoretically ―race neutral‖ 
assignment practices enacted in the aftermath of Brown). In 1968, the Supreme Court deemed 
freedom-of-choice plans ineffective in achieving the constitutionally mandated goal of school 
desegregation. Green, 391 U.S. at 437–38. 
 24. Magnet schools are a typical school desegregation remedy. They often successfully 
attract affluent and/or white parents to send their children to schools organized by themes and 
often located in predominately poor, minority neighborhoods. See Erica Frankenberg & 
Genevieve Siegel-Hawley, Choosing Diversity: School Choice and Racial Integration in the 
Age of Obama, 6 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 219, 224–26 (2010). For a discussion of some of the 
problems with magnet schools, see Martha Minow, Confronting the Seduction of Choice: Law, 
Education, and American Pluralism, 120 YALE L.J. 814, 826 (2011) (noting that magnet school 
programs can ―sometimes produce diverse enrollments while reducing diversity in the non-
magnet schools‖ and implying that magnet schools reduce funding for non-magnet schools, all 
to the detriment of those not attending magnet schools). Voluntary transfer policies are also 
often employed to foster integration. See Frankenberg & Siegel-Hawley, supra, at 226–27.  
 25. See James Forman, Jr., The Secret History of School Choice: How Progressives Got 
There First, 93 GEO. L.J. 1287, 1295–1300 (2005). Professor Forman traces the role of choice 
employed for the benefit of African Americans to the Reconstruction Period. See id. at 1291–
95. 
 26. See generally RYAN, supra note 5, at 304. 
 27. Charter schools are public schools and receive public funding, but they need not abide 
by all of the rules imposed on other public schools. Wendy Parker, The Color of Choice: Race 
and Charter Schools, 75 TUL. L. REV. 566, 576–77 (2001) [hereinafter Parker, The Color of 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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promoted charter schools.
28
 As a candidate in 2008, President Obama 
proposed doubling charter school funding, a commitment he is fast 
fulfilling.
29
 In fact, today it is difficult to find groups opposed to 
charter schools. Those most likely to oppose charter schools are an 
unlikely pair: teachers’ unions and suburban parents.30 
Today over five thousand charter schools educate almost two 
million children.
31
 As states compete for Race to the Top funding, 
which supports charter schools,
32 
and as Congress increases federal 
funding for charter schools,
33
 that number is expected to continue to 
 
Choice]. State legislation authorizes charter schools and delineates where charter schools can 
operate as well as who may authorize and operate charter schools. Id. at 575–76. In 1991, 
Minnesota was the first state to pass legislation enabling the formation of charter schools. 
Closing the Achievement Gap: Charter School FAQ, PUB. BROAD. SERV., http://www.pbs.org/ 
closingtheachievementgap/faq.html#q13. Other intradistrict and interdistrict choice mechanisms 
used by various districts include magnet schools, transfer policies, and private school tuition 
vouchers. See generally RYAN, supra note 5, at 185–209. 
 28. See Stephen Eisdorfer, Public School Choice and Racial Integration, 24 SETON HALL 
L. REV. 937, 937 (1993) (discussing the support of Presidents Reagan and George H. Bush for 
charter schools); Frankenberg & Siegel-Hawley, supra note 24, at 228–29 (detailing the support 
of Presidents Clinton and George W. Bush for charter schools); Paul E. Peterson, School 
Choice: A Report Card, 6 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 47, 53 (1998) (noting that President Clinton 
as well as presidential candidate Bob Dole supported charter schools); see also Frankenberg & 
Siegel-Hawley, supra note 24, at 228 (―Competitive funding for charters grew exponentially, 
rising from $6 million in federal grant money in 1995 to $217 million in 2005.‖). 
 29. See Frankenberg & Siegel-Hawley, supra note 24, at 229, 244.  
 30. RYAN, supra note 5, at 201 (―Suburbanites, in general, seem less interested in charter 
schools. In fact, in some suburban districts, charter schools are seen not only as unnecessary but 
as an insult to local public schools and a threat to property values.‖); Suhrid S. Gajendragadkar, 
Note, The Constitutionality of Racial Balancing in Charter Schools, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 144, 
151–52 (2006) (―Public school teacher unions feel threatened because charter school teachers 
are not unionized.‖). For a discussion of the concentration of charter schools in urban areas, see 
infra Part I.C.3.  
 31. These figures are for the 2010–11 school year and come from a pro-charter school 
group, the National Alliance for Public Charter Schools. See Public Charter Schools 
Dashboard: Schools Overview, NAT’L ALLIANCE FOR PUB. CHARTER SCH., http://dashboard 
.publiccharters.org/dashboard/schools/page/overview/year/2011 (last visited Aug. 21, 2012); 
Public Charter Schools Dashboard: Students Overview, NAT’L ALLIANCE FOR PUB. CHARTER 
SCH., http://dashboard.publiccharters.org/dashboard/students/page/overview/year/2011 (last 
visited Aug. 21, 2012). The U.S. Department of Education reported almost five thousand 
charter schools during the 2009-10 school year, with a total of 1.6 million students. See 
Numbers and Types of Public Elementary and Secondary Schools From the Common Core of 
Data: School Year 2009–10, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, tbl.2, at 7; tbl.3, at 9, 
http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2011/2011345.pdf. 
 32. See infra Part III.A.1. 
 33. See infra Part III.B. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol40/iss1/4
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rise.
34
 Yet, the overall percentage of public school students attending 
charter schools is still quite small—less than 4 percent.35  
Charter schools are designed to promote educational excellence 
not through integration or segregation, but instead by creating a 
competitive market for public educational dollars.
36
 With the addition 
of charter schools, public school monopolies on public educational 
monies end. Instead, traditional public and charter schools would 
compete for public funding. By increasing competition, the theory 
holds, both traditional public and charter schools would improve 
educational offerings, for the benefit of all students.
37
  
Individual parents play a significant role in ensuring that this 
competition works. Parents or other caregivers must be willing and 
able to reject their assigned traditional public school for a presumably 
better charter school, and likely must provide their own transportation 
to that school.
38
  
Charter schools do not charge tuition and cannot explicitly select 
their students.
39
 Student assignments are largely first-come, first-
served.
40
 If there are more applications than spaces,
41
 most states 
require lotteries to determine student admission.
42
  
Not surprisingly, some charter schools are better than others.
43
 
Overall, the educational success of charter schools is mixed.
44
  
 
 34. In 2006–07, the number of charter schools was just under four thousand; that number 
has increased every year to the current estimate of more than five thousand. See Public Charter 
Schools Dashboard: Schools Overview, supra note 31. 
 35. Id. 
 36. See James Forman, Do Charter Schools Threaten Public Education? Emerging 
Evidence from Fifteen Years of a Quasi-Market for Schooling, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 839, 842–
45 (2007). 
 37. Id. at 850–51; see also Gajendragadkar, supra note 30, at 147–48. 
 38. For a detailed look at transportation policies for charter schools by state, see ERICA 
FRANKENBERG ET AL., CHOICE WITHOUT EQUITY: CHARTER SCHOOL SEGREGATION & THE 
NEED FOR CIVIL RIGHTS STANDARDS 60, Appendix B at 113–20 (2010), available at http:// 
civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k-12-education/integration-and-diversity/choice-without-eq 
uity-2009-report/frankenberg-choices-without-equity-2010.pdf. Appendix B demonstrates that 
most states do not require charter schools to provide transportation. 
 39. RYAN, supra note 5, at 198. 
 40. Parker, The Color of Choice, supra note 27, at 577. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. The rules for lotteries, however, can at times serve as opportunities for segregation. 
See Frankenberg & Siegel-Hawley, supra note 24, at 242 n.11. 
 43. RYAN, supra note 5, at 221–28. 
 44. See generally Multiple Choice: Charter School Performance in 16 States, CTR. FOR 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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2. Missouri 
Missouri passed its charter school legislation in 1998, and until 
recently restricted charter schools to Kansas City and St. Louis City, 
both predominately minority school districts.
45
 The state’s first 
charter schools opened in Kansas City for the 1999–2000 school 
year; St. Louis City charter schools followed the next school year. 
Any non-profit organization sponsored by an entity listed in the 
statute can operate a charter school, with the Missouri state education 
board charged with monitoring statutory compliance.
46
 Missouri’s 
charter school laws include no requirements about the demographics 
of students enrolled in its charter schools, other than prohibiting 
discrimination in student enrollment.
47
 
Charter schools have a strong presence in both school districts. 
About one in three St. Louis City public school students attends a 
charter school.
48
 In Kansas City, that rate is slightly higher.
49
  
 
RES. ON EDUC. OUTCOMES AT STAN. U. (2009), http://credo.stanford.edu/reports/MULTIPLE_ 
CHOICE_CREDO.pdf (finding that, on average, charter schools are slightly less successful 
than traditional public schools); WHERE CHARTER SCHOOL POLICY FAILS: THE PROBLEMS OF 
ACCOUNTABILITY & EQUITY (Amy Stuart Wells ed., 2002) (examining twenty-seven charter 
schools and noting that ―charter schools are so diverse and so disparate in terms of their quality 
and viability that it would be misleading to generalize about the success or failure of these 
schools . . .‖); RON ZIMMER ET AL., CHARTER SCHOOLS IN EIGHT STATES, at xii (2009) 
available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG869.pdf (noting that 
academic performance varies among individual schools, whether charter or traditional). 
 45. See MO. REV. STAT. § 167.400.2 (2005). Recent legislation has allowed charter 
schools to be operated elsewhere in the state. See Charter Schools Bill Becomes Law, COLUM. 
DAILY TRIB., June 28, 2012, at A2. 
 46. MO. REV. STAT. § 160.400(2) (2006). 
 47. Id. § 160.410.1-.3. 
 48. Specifically, 11,526 students were enrolled in schools operated by nineteen St. Louis 
charter organizations (some operating more than one school facility) as of fall 2011. Charter 
school enrollment data was obtained from Missouri’s Department of Education website. See St. 
Louis Charter School Fall Enrollment Data 2011–12, MO. DEP’T OF ELEMENTARY & 
SECONDARY EDUC., http://dese.mo.gov/divimprove/charterschools/documents/2011-2012St. 
LouisCharterSchoolsEnrollment2.pdf (last visited Aug. 21, 2012). In comparison, 23,576 
students were enrolled in St. Louis City traditional public schools for that school year. See 2011 
St. Louis City District Report Card, supra note 9. Those statistics produce a charter school 
enrollment rate of nearly 33 percent for students in the St. Louis City public school system. 
 49. Specifically, 10,003 students were enrolled in schools operated by twenty-two Kansas 
City charter organizations as of fall 2011. See Kansas City Charter School Fall Enrollment 
Data 2011–12, MO. DEP’T OF ELEMENTARY & SECONDARY EDUC., http://dese.mo.gov/ 
divimprove/charterschools/documents/2011-2012KansasCityCharterSchoolsEnrollmentpdf.pdf. 
In comparison, 15,826 students were enrolled in Kansas City School District traditional public 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol40/iss1/4
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C. Segregation by Design 
Unless we expect everyone to make the same choice, the nature of 
choice is permitting and validating difference. Choosing an ice cream 
flavor distinguishes ice cream lovers by taste. School choice is 
similar. It allows parents to enroll their children according to the 
parent’s values, rather than accepting a student assignment from the 
school district. Dean Martha Minow notes well the consequences of 
allowing parental choice: we are changing public schooling from 
creating a community value to satisfying individual desires.
50
  
The question becomes whether school choice facilitates self-
segregation by race and class. The answer appears to be a strong 
―yes.‖ Social science research indicates that parental choices vary by 
both race and class.
51
 Parents of all races generally prefer a school in 
which their child’s race is in the majority.52 Access to information 
and transportation also affects whether a parent is able to make a 
choice and effectuate that choice—and those factors vary by race and 
class as well.
53
 Based on this research focusing on parental 
preferences and parental resources, one would expect methods of 
choice to increase racial and economic segregation. This mirrors the 
self-segregation we see throughout American life. 
This Part puts aside these aspects of the practice of choice that 
facilitate racial and economic segregation. Instead, it asks a different 
question: have we designed charter schools to allow and/or promote 
self-segregation by race and class? In other words, does charter 
school legislation facilitate our tendency to self-segregate, or attempt 
to restrain it? 
 
schools for that school year. See 2011 Kansas City District Report Card, supra note 9. Those 
statistics produce a charter school enrollment rate of nearly 39 percent for the students in the 
Kansas City public school system. 
 50. Minow, supra note 24, at 848 (School choice ―converts schooling to private desires. It 
obscures continuing inequalities in access and need; it invites self-separation unless collectively 
controlled. It treats the aggregation of separate decisions as free when the result so often 
impedes freedom and equality.‖). 
 51. See Parker, The Failure of Education Reform, supra note 13, at 414–20 (summarizing 
social science research demonstrating that parental choice varies by class and race). 
 52. See id. at 414, 415 n.152, 418; Parker, The Color of Choice, supra note 27, at 600 and 
n.188. 
 53. See Parker, The Failure of Education Reform, supra note 13, at 414 and nn.149–50. 
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Here I identify three main attributes of charter school legislation 
that enable racial and economic segregation. First, enabling statutes 
either do not impose any enforceable integration standards or are 
completely silent on the importance of integration. Second, and even 
more troubling, charter schools can be and often are designed to 
appeal to particular religious or racial/ethnic groups. Third, charter 
schools are intended as a reform effort primarily for city parents, to 
be executed in segregated school districts. Designing charter schools 
primarily for poor and/or minority students contributes greatly to 
their segregative impact. Each of these ways of segregation by design 
is discussed in turn below. 
1. Lack of Statutory Integration Requirements 
The overwhelming majority of states require no attention to 
diversity and integration by their charter schools for charter schools 
to receive and maintain a charter.
54
 Only twelve of the forty states 
and the District of Columbia authorizing charter schools have any 
integration or diversity requirements at all. 
Nevada and South Carolina have the strictest provisions because 
they have specific numerical goals. Nevada’s statute mandates that 
charter school enrollments be within ten percentage points of the 
student demographics of the school district in which the charter 
 
 54. See Parker, The Color of Choice, supra note 27, at 578–80 (detailing such statutes for 
twelve states as of 2001). For an analysis of the constitutionality of these provisions, see 
Gajendragadkar, supra note 30, at 166–80 (arguing that statutes with flexible diversity 
provisions pass strict scrutiny tests, but strong provisions that effectively ―function as quotas‖ 
do not). A challenge to South Carolina’s diversity provisions was eventually dismissed as moot 
after South Carolina’s legislature modified its statute to ―increase[] its [racial] deviation 
allowance to 20% and excuse[] the new 20% requirement altogether if a noncompliant charter 
school could prove that it operates in a racially nondiscriminatory manner.‖ See Beaufort Cnty. 
Bd. of Educ. v. Lighthouse Charter Sch. Comm., 576 S.E.2d 180, 182 (S.C. 2003); 
Gajendragadkar, supra note 30, at 157–60. 
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school is located.
55
 South Carolina mandates a more forgiving 
standard—twenty percentage points.56  
California, Florida, Kansas, New Jersey, North Carolina, and 
Wisconsin do not specify any defined percentage, but generally 
require that their charter schools reflect the racial composition of the 
student enrollment in the surrounding school district.
57
 Connecticut, 
Hawaii, Ohio, and Rhode Island require a more general commitment 
to ensuring diverse student populations in their charter schools.
58
  
In sum, of the forty-one jurisdictions allowing charter schools, 
only twelve pay some sort of statutory attention to integration. 
 
 55. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 386.580.1 (West 2009) (requiring charter schools in ―zones 
of attendance‖ to ―ensure that the racial composition of pupils enrolled . . . does not differ by 
more than 10% from the racial composition of pupils who attend public schools in the zone‖ if 
the zone’s ―population is 100,000 or more,‖ but also offering ―if practicable‖ and distance 
learning exceptions). 
 56. S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-40-70(D) (Supp. 2011) (requiring that if a ―charter school’s 
enrollment differs from the enrollment of the local school district . . . by more than twenty 
percent,‖ the sponsoring school district board can reject a charter school’s application or revoke 
a previous charter approval, but only if the board finds that the charter is operating in a 
discriminatory manner). The provision also applies to those applying for a charter. See also id. 
§ 59-40-70(G). 
 57. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 47605(b)(5)(G) (West 2009) (requiring charter schools to 
―achieve a racial and ethnic balance among [their] pupils that is reflective of the general 
population . . . of the school district‖); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1002.33.7(a)(8) (West 2012) 
(directing a charter applicant to state in its application how it will achieve ―a racial/ethnic 
balance reflective of the community it serves or within the racial/ethnic range of other public 
schools in the same school district‖); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-1906(d)(2) (2000) (mandating that 
a charter school’s students ―must be reasonably reflective of the racial and socio-economic 
composition of the school district‖); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18a:36A-8(e) (West 1996) (directing 
that ―[t]he admission policy of the charter school shall, to the maximum extent practicable, seek 
the enrollment of a cross section of the community’s school age population,‖ including race and 
other factors); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-238.29F(g)(5) (1996) (requiring that charter schools 
―reasonably reflect‖ the demographics of their surrounding school districts); WIS. STAT. ANN. 
§ 118.40.1(b)(9) (West 2012) (requiring an applicant to include procedures for achieving ―a 
racial and ethnic balance among its pupils that is reflective of the school district population‖). 
 58.  See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-66bb(c) (West 2012) (requiring the State Board of 
Education to consider the proposed charter’s effect on the ―reduction of racial, ethnic and 
economic isolation in the region in which it is to be located‖ when reviewing applications); 
HAW. REV. STAT. § 302B-5(d)(3) (2007) (requiring charter schools to develop a ―plan for 
identifying, recruiting, and selecting students that is not exclusive, elitist, or segregationist‖); 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3314.03(A)(7) (West 2012) (requiring a charter school to ―achieve 
racial and ethnic balance reflective of the community it serves‖); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 16-
77.3-2(a)(10) (West 2010) (directing proposed charter applicants to describe enrollment 
procedures, criteria, policies, or recruitment programs that ―encourage the enrollment of a 
diverse student population‖). 
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Twenty-eight states and the District of Columbia make no mention of 
either diversity or integration. 
Even the states requiring some attention to student demographics 
have limited enforcement measures. A South Carolina charter school 
running afoul of the racial standard need only prove that the school is 
not ―operating in a racially discriminatory manner.‖59 Likewise, 
Nevada requires the integration only ―if practicable.‖60  
I found no specific, statutory guidance on how the schools were to 
attain racial balance. I found no state that included any provisions on 
producing integration.
61
 Instead, charter school legislation treats all 
students alike in terms of admission and outreach efforts. Given the 
differences by race and class embedded in choice,
62
 treating everyone 
alike almost guarantees segregative outcomes.  
Not surprisingly, even states with racial balancing provisions have 
segregated charter schools. An examination of charter schools in 
Nevada and South Carolina, the only states with specific numerical 
diversity requirements, reveals that their charter schools still suffer 
from segregation. Through a quick study of the states’ websites, I 
easily discovered schools in each state that were segregated when 
compared to the school’s surrounding school district. For example, in 
Nevada, Rainbow Dreams Academy is more than 90 percent black,
63
 
while its surrounding school district (Las Vegas, Clark County) is 12 
percent African American.
64
 That same school district, which is 32 
percent white,
65
 also has a charter school, Beacon Academy of 
Nevada, with a 62 percent white student population.
66
 
 
 59. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-40-70(D) and supra note 56. 
 60. See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 386.580.1. 
 61. Parker, The Color of Choice, supra note 27, at 580 (―Rather, the provisions appear to 
reflect a legislative aversion to segregation and disparate impact.‖). 
 62. See supra notes 51–53 and accompanying text.  
 63. See 2010–2011 School Accountability Summary Report 2, RAINBOW DREAMS ACAD., 
http://www.rainbowdreamsacademy.com/2010-11_District_Accoutability_Report.pdf (last 
visited Aug. 22, 2012) (91.3 percent of the student enrollment is African American; an 
additional 7.3 percent is multiracial; no white students are enrolled).  
 64. See 2010–2011 Accountability Report 3, CLARK CNTY. SCH. DIST., http://ccsd.net/ 
schools/pdf/acc_pdfs_2011/2010-2011_District_Accountability_Report.pdf.  
 65. See id. 
 66. See Adequate Yearly Progress Report for 2011–2012 School Year, BEACON ACAD. OF 
NEV., http://beaconacademynv.org/Content/UserUpload/file/AYP_pg1.pdf (last visited Aug. 
13, 2012).  
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In South Carolina, approximately 13 percent of the charter schools 
are virtual, online schools.
67
 One such school operating in Columbia, 
South Carolina, is 68 percent white,
68
 while the two school districts in 
Columbia are overwhelmingly African American.
69
  
The disconnect between charter school legislation promoting 
racial balance and the practice of segregation is not new. An earlier 
study by the U.S. Department of Education identified twelve states 
with high rates of segregation in their charter schools.
70
 Yet, five of 
the states listed also required racial balancing in their charter 
schools.
71
 In sum, the reality of charter school operations contradicts 
legislative racial balancing provisions, suggesting their 
ineffectiveness and meaninglessness.  
2. Identity Schools 
The easiest way to segregate and avert any statutory provisions on 
inclusion is to establish a type of charter school designed to appeal to 
a particular racial/ethnic or religious group.
72
 While by law the 
schools must be open to all students, special-identity schools 
certainly increase segregation in charter schools.
73
 
 
 67. See South Carolina Charter Schools (Composite) 2011–2012, S.C. ST. DEP’T OF 
EDUC., available at http://ed.sc.gov/agency/se/school-transformation/charter-special-focus/ 
documents/CharterList2011-12COMPOSITEforWEB.pdf (Jan. 18, 2012). For the 2011–12 
school year, South Carolina had forty-seven charter schools. Six were described as online, 
virtual, or e-schools. Id. 
 68. See South Carolina Calvert Academy: 2011 Annual School Report Card 6, S.C. ST. 
DEP’T OF EDUC., http://ed.sc.gov/data/report-cards/2011/elem/c/e4701007.pdf (last visited Aug. 
22, 2012) (showing 130 white students out of 191 students total). 
 69. Columbia, South Carolina has two school districts: Richland 1 and Richland 2. 
Richland 1 is nearly 76 percent African American, while Richland 2 is nearly 57 percent 
African American. See Richland 1 School District: 2011 Annual District Report Card, S.C. ST. 
DEP’T OF EDUC., http://ed.sc.gov/data/report-cards/2011/district/c/D4001999.pdf (last visited 
Aug. 22, 2012) (showing 1,006 African American students and 1,331 students total); Richland 
2 School District: 2011 Annual District Report Card, S.C. ST. DEP’T OF EDUC., available at 
http://ed.sc.gov/data/report-cards/2011/district/c/D4002999.pdf (last visited Aug. 22, 2012) 
(showing 920 African American students, out of a total of 1,620). 
 70. The State of Charter Schools 2000: National Study of Charter Schools 2, OFFICE OF 
EDUC. RESEARCH & IMPROVEMENT, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., www2.ed.gov/PDFDocs/4yrrpt.pdf. 
 71. Parker, The Color of Choice, supra note 27, at 594–95. The five states are California, 
Connecticut, Minnesota, New Jersey, and North Carolina. Id. 
 72. Id. at 601–02. 
 73. See MARTHA MINOW, IN BROWN’S WAKE: LEGACIES OF AMERICA’S EDUCATIONAL 
LANDMARK 125, 135–36 (2010). 
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Minnesota provides an interesting example. Its statute once 
required attention to racial balance.
74
 Even then, the state had a 
number of ―special-identity‖ schools.75 The state eventually dropped 
its racial balancing provision,
76
 and it continues its pattern of schools 
designed to appeal to particular racial and ethnic groups.  
For example, St. Paul, Minnesota has several charter schools that 
by design attract a segregated student population. Charter schools in 
St. Paul include a Dugsi Academy intended to attract East African 
children,
77
 a Twin Cities German Immersion School designed for 
those interested in speaking German,
78
 a St. Paul’s Hmong College 
Prep Academy catering to Hmong children,
79
 Academia Cesar 
Chavez for ―advocating Latino cultural values in an environment of 
familia and community,‖80 and a Four Directions Charter School for 
―lifelong learning for American Indian students.‖81 
Not surprisingly, each school’s student enrollment mirrors its 
educational focus. The Dugsi Academy is 100 percent African 
American, Hmong College Prep Academy is nearly 77 percent Asian, 
Academia Cesar Chavez is 92 percent Latino, and Four Directions 
Charter School is 61 percent American Indian.
82
 And all within a 
 
 74. See Parker, The Color of Choice, supra note 27, at 579 n.71. The current version of 
the statute omits the racial balancing provision, and, in addition, includes no provision 
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 124D.10(9) (West 
1999). 
 75. See Parker, The Color of Choice, supra note 27, at 600 n.187, 602. 
 76. See ST. PAUL PUBLIC SCHOOLS 10, http://www.spps.org/uploads/SPPS_History.pdf. 
 77. The school’s 2010–11 Annual Report emphasizes that the school seeks diversity, and 
also notes that its students are primarily recent immigrants from East Africa. 2010–11 Annual 
Report 3, DUGSI ACAD., TWIN CITIES, MINN., http://www.dugsiacademy.org/Upload2/204257/ 
docs/Dugsi%20Academy%20Annual%20Report%2011.pdf (last visited Aug. 22, 2012). 
 78. The school’s website home page states that the school was started ―under the 
sponsorship of the Germanic-American Institute.‖ See TWIN CITIES GERMAN IMMERSION SCH., 
http://www.tcgis.org/index.html (last visited Aug. 22, 2012). 
 79. The welcome page at the school’s website notes that its ―curriculum [is] enriched and 
informed by Hmong culture and language.‖ See HMONG COLL. PREP ACAD., http://www.hmong 
academy.org/index.php1 (last visited Aug. 22, 2012).  
 80. See English Homepage, ACADEMIA CESAR CHAVEZ, http://www.cesarchavezschool 
.com/AcademiaCesarChavez_English.html (last visited Aug. 22, 2012).  
 81. See Home Page, FOUR DIRECTIONS CHARTER SCH., http://fdcsabout.blogspot.com 
(last visited Aug. 22, 2012). 
 82. School enrollment data collected by the Minnesota Department of Education for all 
public schools is available online at Data Reports and Analytics, MINN. DEP’T OF EDUC., 
http://education.state.mn.us/MDEAnalytics/Data.jsp (last visited Aug. 22, 2012). 
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single city, paid for with public money.
83 
Minnesota is not unique. 
States throughout the United States have special-identity charter 
schools.
84
 
This closely mirrors the harm identified by Brown: state-funded, 
public education that is intended for only one identifiable 
racial/ethnic group. Granted, enrollment is not formally restricted by 
law. Yet enrollment is intended to be restricted in operation. The idea 
of separate education sanctioned by law is one of the harms 
denounced by Brown. Identity schools, founded on parental choice 
but allowed and funded by public money, come too close to violating 
Brown’s foundational principles.  
3. Location Limits Choice and Reinforces Segregation 
The geographic placement of charter schools also facilitates 
segregation.
85
 Missouri’s pattern of charter schools in urban school 
districts but not suburban ones is common.
86
 Many states restrict 
charter schools to urban school districts or school districts with low 
student performance.
87
 Other states have statutory provisions giving 
preference to charter schools intended to serve ―disadvantaged‖ 
students.
88
 This design concentrates charter schools in cities with 
large populations of minority and low-income children, away from 
suburban, white, and/or affluent school districts. 
The comparative absence of charter schools in suburban school 
districts is partly a function of parental preference. Professor Jim 
 
 83. For an analysis of whether schools with a religious focus are constitutional under the 
First Amendment, see Gabrielle Marie D’Adamo, Note, Separatism in the Age of Public School 
Choice: A Constitutional Analysis, 58 EMORY L.J. 547 (2008). 
 84. See RYAN, supra note 5, at 201; Parker, The Color of Choice, supra note 27, at 601–
03; D’Adamo, supra note 83, at 547–48. 
 85. FRANKENBERG, supra note 38, at 60 (―The geographic skew of charter schools helps 
to explain some of the aggregate differences in student composition between charter and 
traditional public schools.‖). 
 86. Id. at 57 (―Nationally, charter school students are far more likely to attend schools 
located in cities, especially large cities, than traditional public school students.‖). 
 87. RYAN, supra note 5, at 201 (―At least twelve statutes, for example, require that 
priority be given to charter schools that serve poor, minority, or low-achieving students.‖); 
FRANKENBERG, supra note 38, at 59 (referencing Ohio as a state allowing charter schools only 
in a ―challenged school district‖). 
 88. Parker, The Color of Choice, supra note 27, at 577, 600, and nn.186–87. 
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Ryan makes the important observation that parents in suburban 
school districts often oppose entry of charter schools into their school 
districts.
89
 The primary reasons for this are money and school 
satisfaction. Charter schools are perceived as draining educational 
dollars from existing public schools.
90
 Suburban parents, generally 
satisfied with their schools, do not desire another choice and want to 
retain all monies for their schools. As a result, charter schools are less 
frequent in suburban school districts throughout the United States.
91
  
That makes charter schools destined to operate largely in cities 
with high proportions of minority and low-income students.
92
 In 
theory, students from neighboring school districts can attend the city 
charter schools, but practice differs from theory. Charter schools are 
most often designed for poor students, often African American and 
Latino, and not designed for more affluent or white students. 
Designing charter schools primarily as a reform for cities certainly 
assures their segregation.  
That approach also imposes responsibility for the success of 
charter schools on the backs of poor parents. The entire charter 
school movement depends on parents’ ability to make and 
successfully implement the choices that will improve the education 
their children receive.
93
 Yet, as a method of reform for the most 
disadvantaged, charter schools require much of parents with limited 
resources as a starting point. It seems ironic, at best, that charter 
schools are designed to harness the power of individual action but 
then must rely on the power of those parents with the fewest 
resources. Poor parents are quite simply at a disadvantage when 
 
 89. RYAN, supra note 5, at 201 (―[I]n some suburban districts, charter schools are seen not 
only as unnecessary but as an insult to local public schools and a threat to property values.‖). 
 90. Id. 
 91. For the 2009–10 school year, the National Center for Education Statistics, a unit of the 
Department of Education, observed that 55 percent of charter schools are located in cities, 21 
percent in suburbs, 8 percent in towns, and 16 percent in rural areas. Charter School 
Enrollment, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, http://nces.ed.gov/programs/coe/indicator_ 
cse.asp (last visited Aug. 22, 2012).  
 92. GARY ORFIELD & CHUNGMEI LEE, BROWN AT 50: KING’S DREAM OR PLESSY’S 
NIGHTMARE? 34 (2004), http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k-12-education/integration-
and-diversity/brown-at-50-king2019s-dream-or-plessy2019s-nightmare/orfield-brown-50-2004 
.pdf. 
 93. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
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required to ―shop‖ for a public school.94 Yet, this is the educational 
option our policy makers often embrace as the solution to failing 
schools. 
II. CHARTER SCHOOLS & SEGREGATION 
While Part I revealed how the design of charter schools facilitates 
segregation, this Part turns to actual student enrollment in charter 
schools. Are charter schools more segregated than traditional public 
schools (which themselves have long been known for remarkable 
segregation)? The evidence consistently demonstrates that charter 
schools increase the number of schools hyper-segregated by race, 
ethnicity, and income status, likely in ways detrimental to their 
students’ educational success. This Part documents that pattern in 
Missouri and throughout the United States. 
A. Missouri 
1. St. Louis  
St. Louis City public schools, both traditional and charter, are 
notable for the prevalence of hyper-segregated, minority schools. By 
this, I mean schools with at least a 90 percent minority population. 
Forty-two St. Louis City traditional public schools (out of a total of 
sixty-nine)
95
 are at least 90 percent minority.
96
 This results in 61 
 
 94. Frankenberg & Siegel-Hawley, supra note 24, at 229–30; see also Minow, supra note 
24, at 833 (noting that ―not all families are informed and equipped to navigate the increasingly 
complex process of selecting among educational options, and some of the most disadvantaged 
students will lose out as a result‖); Parker, The Failure of Education Reform, supra note 13, at 
414, 414 n.150 (summarizing the social science research on the difficulty choice places on poor 
parents).  
 95. I excluded from the tallies of schools in both St. Louis and Kansas City buildings with 
no students or located in detention facilities or hospitals. 
 96. Statistics in this section are taken from enrollment data for all school buildings 
organized by school district and made available online by the Missouri Department of 
Elementary and Secondary Education. See Missouri Comprehensive Data System: Building 
Demographic Data, MO. DEP’T OF ELEMENTARY & SECONDARY EDUC., http://mcds.dese.mo 
.gov/quickfacts/Pages/District-and-School-Information.aspx. Only two Kansas City charter 
schools of the 162 total traditional and charter schools in St. Louis City and Kansas City had 
Latino enrollments of 90 percent or more; no traditional or charter public schools in either St. 
Louis City or Kansas City were more than 90 percent white. Id. 
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percent of St. Louis City traditional public schools being hyper-
segregated by race. 
A higher percentage of St. Louis City charter schools are hyper-
segregated. Eighteen out of twenty-six charter schools have at least 
90 percent minority populations, resulting in a percentage rate of 69 
percent. Thus, we see the continuing pattern of hyper-segregated 
schools at both the traditional and charter schools, with charter 
schools slightly more hyper-segregated by race.  
St. Louis racially hyper-segregated public schools are also highly 
segregated by class. In all of the forty-two traditional public schools 
with total minority enrollments of 90 percent or more, at least 80 
percent of all 2011–12 students qualified for the federal free or 
reduced meals (FRM) program. 
The
 pattern is the same in the city’s charter schools: all of the 
eighteen charter schools with at least 90 percent aggregate minority 
enrollment reported FRM membership of 80 percent or more.  
2. Kansas City 
Kansas City, Missouri public schools are also hyper-segregated by 
race and class. Fifty-six percent of traditional public schools 
(eighteen out of thirty-two) have at least 90 percent minority 
enrollment. Kansas City charter schools are also more segregated in 
Kansas City. Twenty-six out of thirty-five charter schools (74 
percent) enroll 90 percent or more minority students. 
Kansas City traditional public schools that are hyper-segregated 
by race also are highly segregated by economics. All traditional 
public schools hyper-segregated by race/ethnicity reported having at 
least 80 percent of their students qualifying for free or reduced meals. 
Similarly, 96 percent of the charter schools hyper-segregated by 
race/ethnicity were also overwhelmingly economically poor in 
student enrollment. 
The following table summarizes the racial/ethnic and economic 
hyper-segregation percentages for Kansas City and St. Louis City 
charter and traditional public schools. As the table shows, charter 
schools are more likely than traditional schools to be racially and 
ethnically hyper-segregated. And, as is the case with their traditional 
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counterparts, virtually all of those hyper-segregated charter schools 
are hyper-segregated by economics. 
 
3. White Enrollment in Charter Schools 
Professor Jim Ryan argues for expansive choice in city school 
districts as a way to entice suburban parents back into city homes and 
schools.
97
 Experience shows that Missouri charter schools do attract a 
number of white students, but not significantly more than traditional 
schools. Overall, Kansas City charter schools have an approximately 
9 percent white student population, as do Kansas City’s traditional 
public schools.
98
 The white enrollment rate in St. Louis City charter 
schools at just more than 12 percent is slightly lower than in the 
city’s traditional public schools, where white enrollment is closer to 
14 percent. 
It is possible that charter schools are increasing the overall 
number of white students enrolling in Kansas City and St. Louis City 
public schools: parents of today’s charter school students might not 
have chosen the city’s traditional public schools if a charter school 
were not available.
99
 Information on how parents would have made 
educational decisions for their children in the absence of charter 
school opportunities is not, however, readily available. 
 
 97. See RYAN, supra note 5, at 286–91. 
 98. Id. 
 99. On a national level, charter school students are less likely to be white than traditional 
public school students. See FRANKENBERG, supra note 38, at 27, tbl.4.  
TYPE OF SCHOOL 90% + 
Minority 
90% + Minority 
and 
80% + FRM 
KC Traditional Public Schools 56% 100% 
KC Charter Schools 74% 96% 
SL Traditional Public Schools 61% 100% 
SL Charter Schools 69% 100% 
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B. National Studies 
The increased segregation by race and, to a lesser extent class, is 
not unique to Missouri. Part of that segregation is due to African 
American (but not Latino) children being more likely to enroll in 
charter schools than their white peers.
100
 Once the students are 
enrolled, minority students are more often placed in segregated 
charter schools, as compared to traditional public schools. Looking at 
hyper-segregated minority schools (at least 90 percent minority 
student enrollment), one report concluded that ―70% of black charter 
school students [in the nation] attend intensely segregated minority 
charter schools . . . or twice as many as the share of intensely 
segregated black students in traditional public schools.‖101 Latino 
segregation is less extreme but still of concern: in 2007–08, ―half of 
Latino charter students were in schools with 90% or more students of 
color.‖102  
That report also concluded that hyper-segregation continues 
throughout the nation at the economic level as well: ―[m]ore than one 
in four charter school students attended a school where at least three-
quarters of students were from low-income households.‖103 Not 
surprisingly, the student most likely to attend a high–minority, high-
poverty school is African American or Latino.
104
 
The disagreement about charter school segregation is not its 
existence but its extent: how much more segregated are charter 
schools than traditional public schools? The answer to that question 
depends on how the comparison is defined.  
 
 100. Id. at 27. See also id. at 27, tbl.4 (showing that charter schools are 39 percent white 
and 32 percent black, compared to traditional public school enrollment at 56 percent white and 
16 percent black). Interestingly, Latino students have comparable enrollment rates in charter 
schools and traditional public schools. Id. at 28. But when this data is disaggregated at state and 
regional levels, the pattern is less clear, although in all regions ―black students are over-enrolled 
in charter schools as compared to their regional public school percentage.‖ See id. at 29–33. 
 101. Id. at 4, 37. 
 102. Id. at 37. 
 103. Id. at 71. This pattern was not true for white charter school students. See id. at 73 
(―White students, however, experience lower exposure to poor students in charter schools than 
they do in traditional public schools.‖). 
 104. Id. at 72–73 (―[M]ore than 9 out of 10 charter schools where at least 90% of students 
were black and Latino also contained a majority of students from low-income households.‖). 
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The highest level of segregation is found when charter schools are 
compared to statewide traditional public school enrollment. That 
comparison certainly overstates, however, the level of charter school 
segregation.
105
 Given that charter schools are concentrated (often by 
law) in minority neighborhoods,
106
 one would generally expect 
charter schools to have a much higher minority enrollment than that 
found statewide. It seems silly to expect a student in El Paso, for 
example, to attend a charter school in Houston, hundreds of miles 
from home. Even a much shorter commute of twenty miles within a 
large metropolitan area seems unlikely as well, as most charter 
schools do not provide transportation.
107
 Given that charter schools 
are overwhelmingly located in cities with predominately minority 
public school student enrollment, their student bodies typically (and I 
argue by design) reflect their surrounding neighborhoods.
108
  
Instead of statewide comparison, the more informative 
comparison would be to the school district in which the charter 
school sits or the broader metropolitan area. The segregation in 
charter schools is typically larger when charter school enrollment is 
compared to the surrounding metropolitan school enrollment, which 
includes whiter, suburban school districts.  
A January 2010 report by the Civil Rights Project/Proyecto 
Derechos Civiles (CRP) used metropolitan student enrollment data on 
the theory that most if not all charter schools do not confine their 
student enrollment to children living within traditional school district 
boundary lines.
109
 For example, in Missouri, suburban children who 
 
 105. A state may be overwhelmingly white but its minority populations concentrated in 
urban areas. In some cases, those urban areas with high concentrations of minority populations 
are the only areas in the state where charter schools are permitted. Also where the minority 
population is small and evenly distributed throughout an overwhelmingly white majority state, 
all minority charter school students may attend white-dominated schools. For example, one 
report noted that in Idaho ―charter school students across all races attend schools of white 
isolation: majorities of students of all races are in 90–100% white charter schools.‖ Id. at 43. 
The report then contrasts this with Arkansas, where ―the percentage of students in segregated 
white schools varies substantially by race.‖ Id. The difference, however, is almost certainly due 
to Idaho’s extremely white population, in contrast to the more diverse population of Arkansas.  
 106. See supra Part I.C.3. 
 107. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
 108. See supra Part I.C.3. 
 109. Civil Rights Project’s Response to ―Re-analysis‖ of Charter School Study, CIVIL 
RIGHTS PROJECT 1–2 (Apr. 29, 2010), http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/news/news-and-
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can participate in Kansas City and St. Louis City voluntary transfer 
programs can also enroll in charter schools in those cities.
110
 Given 
that charter schools are intended to cross school district lines, the 
CRP researchers argue that it is fair to compare charter school 
demographics with those of the surrounding metropolitan area.  
With this comparison group employed for thirty-nine cities, and 
aggregating the data, CRP reported that 45 percent of charter schools 
in metropolitan areas were hyper-segregated, compared to 25 percent 
of traditional public schools in those same metropolitan areas, a 
twenty-point difference.
111
 In other words, charter schools were 
almost twice as likely to be hyper-segregated by race or ethnicity, a 
sharp increase. 
If the charter schools are instead compared only to their 
surrounding school districts, that difference drops from 20 percent to 
10 percent, as found by scholars at the University of Arkansas when 
they aggregated the raw data for CRP’s eight largest metropolitan 
areas by school district and compared charter school segregation data 
only to data for the school district in which the charter schools 
reside.
112
 
While CRP looked to the theory of charter schools—they are 
intended to cross segregated neighborhoods to provide more choice 
—the University of Arkansas scholars examined the reality of charter 
schools. That is, charter schools overwhelmingly enroll students from 
within their surrounding school districts. Either way, however, 
charter schools are more segregated by race than the traditional 
 
announcements/2010-site-news/crps-response-to-re-analysis-of-charter-school-study/crp-re 
sponse-to-reanalysis-choice-without-equity.pdf; Gajendragadkar, supra note 30, at 145 
(―Charter schools possess the potential to increase integration levels because their student 
enrollments are not limited by district boundary lines.‖). 
 110. MO. REV. STAT. § 160.410.1(2) (2006). 
 111. CRP reports its data by metropolitan statistical area, or MSA. See, e.g., 
FRANKENBERG, supra note 38, at 35–36, tbl.7. A group of scholars at the University of 
Arkansas used an alternate methodology, aggregating CRP’s raw data by school district to 
produce district-level segregation comparisons. See Gary Ritter et al., A Closer Look at Charter 
Schools and Segregation: Flawed Comparisons Lead to Overstated Conclusions, 10 EDUC. 
NEXT 69, 71–72 (2011), http://educationnext.org/files/EdNext_20103_69.pdf (criticizing Civil 
Rights Project metropolitan area methodology, arguing that comparisons within districts are 
more methodologically appropriate, and finding that intradistrict methodologies produce far 
more favorable hyper-segregation comparisons between charters and traditional public schools). 
 112. Ritter, supra note 111, at 71–72.  
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public schools located nearby. With their more restricted definition of 
the comparison pool, the Arkansas researchers demonstrated that 53 
percent of traditional public schools were hyper-segregated, 
compared to 63 percent of the charter schools in those school 
districts.
113
  
Kansas City, Missouri is one metropolitan area studied by both the 
CRP and the University of Arkansas, and it demonstrates how 
differences in comparison groups can impact the numbers. 
Comparing Kansas City charter school enrollment with Kansas City 
metropolitan area traditional public school enrollment, CRP reported 
a 79 percent difference between charter school hyper-segregation and 
traditional public school hyper-segregation—85 percent hyper-
segregation in charter schools compared to 6 percent in traditional 
public schools.
114
 Comparing Kansas City charter schools to the 
school district in which they reside, University of Arkansas 
researchers found a difference of 61 percent, still a significant 
difference, but much less than 79 percent.
115
 
Another way to determine whether charter schools increase 
segregation is to compare the demographics of a student’s charter 
school to those of the traditional public school from which that 
student transferred. The RAND Corporation (RAND), a nationally 
recognized non-profit research organization, reported on five large 
metropolitan areas (Chicago, Denver, Milwaukee, Philadelphia, and 
San Diego) and two states (Ohio and Texas) after tracking individual 
students as they moved from traditional schools to charter schools.
116
 
RAND found that in five of the seven areas studied (Denver, 
Philadelphia, Ohio, San Diego, and Texas), African American 
students transferred from traditional public schools to charter schools 
with a slightly greater minority population.
117
 The same pattern was 
also generally true but to a lesser degree for white students in all 
 
 113. Id. at 72, fig.1. 
 114. FRANKENBERG, supra note 38, at 41, tbl.10.  
 115. See Gary Ritter et al., Supplemental Material for ―A Closer Look at Charter Schools 
and Segregation,‖ EDUC. NEXT Appendix tbl.3, http://educationnext.org/files/20103_Ritter_ 
Supplement.pdf (last visited Aug. 23, 2012). 
 116. ZIMMER, supra note 44, at xii, tbl.2.3 at 14–17, 18.  
 117. Id. at 18. 
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seven areas: they generally transferred to charter schools that were 
whiter than the traditional public school from which they came.
118
  
This is striking in that it demonstrates that charter schools actually 
increase the segregative experiences of their students. But the degree 
of additional segregation was not high in either situation. Only one 
area exhibited an increased segregation differential in excess of 10 
percent for African American students, and segregation of white 
students never increased by more than 10 percent in any area when 
white students moved from traditional to charter schools.
119
 Yet, the 
study still demonstrated that charter schools are giving their students 
a more segregative experience than those students had in traditional 
public schools. I found no national study demonstrating that charter 
schools decreased school segregation.  
In sum, national studies to date have consistently found that 
charter schools are more segregated than the schools in their 
surrounding metropolitan areas and even in their surrounding school 
districts.
120
 These findings are consistent with earlier research on the 
segregation found in charter schools.
121
 Charter school segregation is 
also consistent with social science research finding that parental 
preference varies by race and class, as does parental access to 
information and resources needed to effectuate choice.
122
  
Given the problems typically associated with high-minority, high-
poverty schools, any increase in the number of such schools is cause 
for serious concern. Charter schools, so far, are not leading us toward 
integration, but instead toward segregation.  
 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. For summaries of other research documenting the trend toward segregation in 
particular cities or states, see FRANKENBERG, supra note 38, at 9–13; Frankenberg & Siegel-
Hawley, supra note 24, at 245 n.124; Amy Stambach & Natalie Crow Becker, Finding the Old 
in the New: On Race and Class in US Charter School Debates, 9 RACE, ETHNICITY & EDUC. 
159, 161 (2006); Leland Ware & Cara Robinson, Charters, Choice, and Resegregation, 1 DEL. 
L. REV. 1, 11–12 (2009). 
 121. See Parker, The Color of Choice, supra note 27, at 600–01 nn.188–90 (detailing the 
research as of 2000). 
 122. See supra notes 51–53 and accompanying text. 
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C. Today’s Freedom-of-Choice 
This Part argues that charter schools are more segregative in 
practice and theory than the outlawed freedom-of-choice plans of the 
1960s. By concentrating charter schools in cities and allowing 
special-identity schools, charter schools segregate more than 
freedom-of-choice plans. 
One of the South’s attempts to thwart the integrative reach of 
Brown was offering parents ―freedom of choice‖ for student 
assignments.
123
 The plans were entirely race neutral in language, and 
gave all parents the choice as to which public school to send their 
children. In 1968, the Supreme Court struck down one such plan for
 
its ineffectiveness in desegregating the rural county’s school 
system.
124
 As that plan was implemented, no white children sought to 
attend the African American school. African American children did, 
however, increasingly apply to attend the white school. Yet, after two 
years of the plan’s operation, 85 percent of the district’s African 
American children still attended a 100 percent minority school.
125
  
The central problem with charter schools is not that they offer 
educational choice, particularly for city parents. The parents certainly 
deserve more options for effective schooling for their children. In 
fact, society in general would benefit with better city schools.  
The problem is not choice, but the choices offered. The choice 
between a traditional public school and a charter school too often is a 
choice of which high-minority, high-poverty school to attend.
126
 Such 
schools are undoubtedly the hardest schools to operate 
successfully;
127
 yet, too often they are the only options offered. The 
limited nature of the choices afforded is a natural consequence of the 
 
 123. See Parker, Connecting the Dots, supra note 22, at 1709–14 (examining how the 
South attempted to avert integration through race neutral student assignment plans). 
 124. Green v. Cnty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 439–40 (1968) (―Not a single white child has 
chosen to attend the [African American] school.‖). 
 125. The number of African American children attending the white school increased from 
35 in 1965 to 111 in 1966, but ―85% of the Negro children in the system still attended the all-
Negro [] school‖ even though roughly half of the district’s 4,500 population of school-aged 
children were African American. Id. at 432, 441. 
 126. See Parker, The Failure of Education Reform, supra note 13, at 416. 
 127. See generally RYAN, supra note 5, at 277–78. 
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theory that charter schools should be concentrated in city school 
districts.
128
  
The chances of converting high-poverty, high-minority charter 
schools into places of integrative learning are surely slim as well. No 
one really expects whites in significant numbers to choose these 
charter schools.
129
 Charter schools offer different curricula and 
different educational approaches, but they do not offer anything 
different from the perspective of student demographics.  
In this respect, charter schools afford less choice than that given in 
rural Virginia in the aftermath of Brown. Students in the 1960s were 
offered very different school experiences through the freedom-of-
choice plans: an African American school or a white school. Most 
charter schools do not offer that type of choice. In that sense, charter 
schools are often more segregative than the freedom-of-choice plans 
of the 1960s. 
Further exacerbating the limits of the demographic choices 
offered through the charter school movement are ―special-identity‖ 
charter schools
130—another opportunity for segregated learning 
experiences financed with public money. They offer minority parents 
yet another opportunity to choose to self-segregate. That choice, 
―freely-executed,‖ then gives both white parents and the school 
district’s governing body a perfect excuse to wash their hands of any 
involvement in or responsibility for the educational experience for 
that child. Special-identity charter schools represent the antithesis of 
Brown’s integrative ideal, particularly given their public funding and 
their legislative creation. The next Part considers the role of the 
federal government in promoting charter schools, and their attending 
segregation.  
 
 128. See supra Part I.C.3. 
 129. See generally Charles R. Lawrence III, Forbidden Conversations: On Race, Privacy, 
and Community (A Continuing Conversation with John Ely on Racism and Democracy), 114 
YALE L.J. 1353, 1355 (2005) (recounting the difficulties of convincing his middle-class 
neighbors, both African American and white, to send their children to the nearby, 
predominately minority elementary school). This tendency was also true under the regime 
rejected by Green—no white parent chose the African American school, and it is unlikely 
anyone expected them to do so. See supra note 124 and accompanying text. 
 130. See supra Part I.C.2. 
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III. FEDERAL GOVERNMENT & CHARTER SCHOOLS 
This Part examines the role of the federal government in 
promoting and funding charter schools. It begins by examining how 
choice is encouraged by two broad federal programs, Race to the Top 
(RTT)
131
 and No Child Left Behind (NCLB).
132
 Neither does much to 
further the goal of school integration; rather, both allow segregative 
choice. I then examine how federal fiscal policy largely ignores the 
value of diversity in education, awarding millions of dollars for 
educational initiatives that segregate. Finally, I propose that this 
system must change, or we will repeat the immediate aftermath of 
Brown when public dollars funded segregation. 
A. RTT & NCLB 
1. RTT 
President Obama’s signature education initiative is Race to the 
Top, a way for states to compete for and win additional federal 
funding.
133
 The RTT application process rewards states that ―ensure 
successful conditions for high-performing charters and other 
innovative schools.‖134 This section is worth up to forty points, out of 
five hundred possible points.
135
 Specifically, a state can receive 
points for not limiting the number of charter schools, giving charter 
schools ―equitable funding compared to traditional public schools,‖ 
and providing state funding for charter school facilities.
136
  
 
 131. See generally American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 
§§ 14005–14006, 123 Stat. 115, 282–84; Race to the Top Program: Executive Summary, infra 
note 133.  
 132. See generally No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 
(2002) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301–8962 (2006)). 
 133. For an official description of the operation of the program and its charter school 
provisions, see Race to the Top Program Executive Summary, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. 3, 7, 11, 13 
(Nov. 2009), http://www2.ed.gov/programs/racetothetop/executive-summary.pdf. 
 134. Race to the Top Fund, 74 Fed. Reg. 59,688, 59,804 (Nov. 18, 2009) (adopted as final 
rule with minor changes to the criteria for award of points pursuant to that charter school rating 
factor at 75 Fed. Reg. 4464 (Jan. 27, 2010) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. Subtitle B, Chapter II)).  
 135. Id. at 59,813, 59,825. 
 136. Id. at 59,804. 
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The U.S. Department of Education has emphasized, however, that 
charter schools are not the sole answer to solving educational 
inequity and closing the achievement gap.
137
 Yet, the additional 
points did inspire many states to open up their charter school laws,
 
and RTT has certainly increased and will continue to increase the 
number of charter schools throughout the nation.
138
  
2. NCLB 
The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, adopted in 2002 and 
amended in 2006, promotes school choice in general through its 
sanction provisions for schools not meeting their NCLB 
requirements.
139
  
First, NCLB specifically mentions conversion to a charter as one 
way to improve a low-performing school.
140
 Second, students 
attending failing schools have the opportunity (in theory at least) to 
transfer to another public school.
141
  
 
 137. Id. at 59,691, 59,768. In fact, two Phase I top-scoring states, Delaware and Tennessee, 
received only thirty and thirty-one of the possible forty points for their charter school laws. See 
Race to the Top Fund: States’ Applications, Scores and Comments for Phase 1, U.S. DEP’T OF 
EDUC., http://www2.ed.gov/programs/racetothetop/phase1-applications/index.html (last visited 
Aug. 23, 2012). Other states had higher charter school rating factor scores, but were not 
winners. Id.  
 138. See, e.g., Jennifer Medina, State Looks at Doubling Cap on Charter Schools, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 15, 2010, at A16 (describing New York’s quest to conform its charter school laws 
to meet RTT priorities, although some opposed the total elimination of a cap on the number of 
charters); Lynn Bonner, Legislature Votes to Lift Cap on Charter Schools, CHARLOTTE 
OBSERVER, June 10, 2011, available at http://www.charlotteobserver.com/2011/06/10/ 
2365346/legislture-votes-to-lift-cap.html (describing North Carolina’s elimination of its 100-
school cap on the number of charter schools, but silent on whether or not the changes were 
proposed in response to RTT selection factors). 
 139. For a discussion of the role of charter schools in the No Child Left Behind initiative, 
see No Child Left Behind and Charter Schools: Giving Parents Information and Options, U.S. 
DEP’T OF EDUC. 38 (May 2007), http://www2.ed.gov/nclb/choice/charter/nclb-charter.html (last 
visited Aug. 23, 2012). For the Obama Administration’s discussion of ―redefining the federal 
role in education,‖ a somewhat vague critique of the No Child Left Behind program, see A 
Blueprint for Reform: The Reauthorization of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, 
U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. 39–41 (2010), http://www2.ed.gov/policy/elsec/leg/blueprint/blueprint 
.pdf (last visited Aug. 23, 2012). 
 140. A school continually failing to make adequate yearly progress must be restructured. 
See 20 U.S.C. § 6316(b)(8)(A), (B). Charter schools are one restructuring option. Id. 
§ 6316(b)(8)(B). 
 141. Students attending schools that have failed to make adequate yearly progress for at 
least two consecutive years must be given a chance to transfer to a school ―not identified for 
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The sanctioning provisions of NCLB, however, have likely had a 
minor effect on changing the demographics of public schools, both 
traditional and charter, because they are so rarely invoked.
142
 The 
more significant impact of NCLB is the addition of Charter School 
Program funding. This funding, along with other sources of federal 
grants, is addressed in the next Part. 
B. Federal Money 
1. The Money 
A pro-charter school group lists over one hundred avenues for 
federal grant money.
143
 The largest amount of grant money available 
recently is federal stimulus spending through the Investing in 
Innovation (i3) fund. These grants are awarded by the Department of 
Education for the purpose of ―improving student achievement.‖144 
The i3 program lists many aspects of improving student achievement, 
but completely omits integration as relevant, whether the integration 
is racial or economic.
145
 The federal government awarded $646 
million for education initiatives through the i3 program in 2010.
146
 
Amounts distributed in 2011 were substantially less but still 
significant, totaling $148 million.
147
  
 
school improvement,‖ with transportation provided. 20 U.S.C. § 6316(b)(1)(E)(i), (b)(9). 
Priority for transfers is given to the ―lowest achieving children from low-income families.‖ Id. 
§ 6316(b)(1)(E)(ii).  
 142. James E. Ryan, The Perverse Incentives of the No Child Left Behind Act, 79 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 932, 946–47 (2004).  
 143. See Finding Federal Funding for Charter Schools: A User’s Guide, NAT’L RES. CTR. 
ON CHARTER SCH. FIN. & GOVERNANCE 3, 24–28 (Aug. 2009), http://www.charterresource.org/ 
files/TFP_CharterSchools_Users_Guide.pdf.  
 144. See Investing in Innovation Fund (I3): Purpose, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. OFFICE OF 
INNOVATION & IMPROVEMENT, http://www2.ed.gov/programs/innovation/index.html (last 
visited Aug. 23, 2012). 
 145. Id. (listing as goals improving ―student achievement or student growth, closing 
achievement gaps, decreasing dropout rates, increasing high school graduation rates, or 
increasing college enrollment and completion rates‖). 
 146. Investment in Innovation Fund (I3): Funding Status, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. OFFICE OF 
INNOVATION & IMPROVEMENT, http://www2.ed.gov/programs/innovation/funding.html (last 
visited Aug. 23, 2012). 
 147. Id.  
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Charter schools have won some of these grants. Most notably, the 
KIPP Foundation—a very successful charter school operator of high-
minority, high-poverty charter schools
148—recently won a five-year 
grant worth $50 million.
149
 Other charter schools have also 
successfully applied for i3 funding.
150
 
The most longstanding federal program for funding charter 
schools is the Charter School Program (CSP). That program began in 
1995, with less than $5 million distributed for charter school 
improvement.
151
 By 2011, that amount had increased to almost $200 
million.
152
  
In 2011, CSP changed its funding guidelines to recognize the 
importance of promoting diversity. Specifically, applicants can 
receive up to five points out of a possible total of 110 for ―[p]rojects 
that are designed to promote student diversity, including racial and 
ethnic diversity, or avoid racial isolation.‖153  
Although adding this factor and these points to the application 
ranking process is progress, the actual impact of the change appears 
minor. Diversity is not the aim of the grants—instead the program’s 
purpose is increasing the number of quality charter schools.
154
 The 
 
 148. See RYAN, supra note 5, at 223–25. The schools are overwhelmingly minority and 
highly academically successful. Id. Professor Ryan argues that the KIPP model, while 
successful, cannot be widely duplicated. Id. 
 149. See Investment in Innovation Fund (I3): California 2010 Scale-Up Grant Abstract, 
U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. OFFICE OF INNOVATION & IMPROVEMENT, http://www2.ed.gov/programs/ 
innovation/2010/awards/scale-up/ca.html (last visited Aug. 23, 2012). 
 150. See KIPP, New Schools for New Orleans Among Charter Winners of i3 Grants, NAT’L 
CHARTER SCH. RES. CTR. (Aug. 5, 2010), http://www.charterschoolcenter.org/news/kipp-new-
schools-new-orleans-among-charter-winners-i3-grants.  
 151. See Charter Schools Program State Educational Agencies (SEA) Grant: Funding 
Status, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., http://www2.ed.gov/programs/charter/funding.html (last visited 
Aug. 23, 2012). 
 152. See id. 
 153. 76 Fed. Reg. 4322, 4324 (2011).  
 154. Id. at 4323.  
The purpose of the CSP is to increase national understanding of the charter school 
model (1) by expanding the number of high-quality charter schools available to 
students across the Nation by providing financial assistance for the planning, program 
design, and initial implementation of charter schools, and (2) by evaluating the effects 
of charter schools, including their effects on students, student academic achievement, 
staff, and parents. 
Id. 
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first priority, periodic review and evaluation, gets twice as many 
points.
155
 Moreover, the inclusion of diversity in 2011 does not seem 
to signal a shift in how money gets awarded. I found no evidence of a 
grant being awarded for promoting diversity. 
2. Financing Inequality 
Professor Olatunde C. A. Johnson has analyzed recent federal 
economic stimulus spending in the civil rights context.
156
 He makes 
the compelling argument that the stimulus package has financed 
housing, transportation, and education in ways that ―threaten to 
preserve and even deepen racial inequality.‖157 Charter school 
funding—a reform easy to sell to the public—fits this pattern as well. 
As revealed earlier, charter schools segregate; they often even 
segregate more than our already segregated traditional public 
schools.
158
 Yet, when our federal government awards charter schools 
public money, it never asks whether the charter school is segregated, 
however one might define that status. Instead, our limited public 
education dollars subsidize charter schools that segregate. The federal 
government even promises funding to special-identity charter 
schools.
159
 Charter schools can choose to attempt integration, and get 
an additional five points on their application for CPS funding.
160
 But 
no one is asking or requiring charter schools to integrate because 
integration is right for our educational system. Nor is anyone asking 
that charter schools simply not increase our current levels of 
 
 155. Id. 
 156. See Olatunde C.A. Johnson, Essay, Stimulus and Civil Rights, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 
154, 155 (2011). 
 157. Id. at 158. 
 158. See supra Part II. 
 159. One recent notable example of federal funding for an identity charter school is the 
federal government’s award of $600,000 to a proposed Tikun Olam Hebrew Language Charter 
High School in New Jersey. See Michael Winerip, Rejected 3 Times, School May Still Open 
Soon, and With a Grant, Too, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2012, at A17. The state had rejected the 
charter, and many opposed the charter because it would ―drain resources from traditional public 
schools in order to provide a free Jewish education that should be the responsibility of private 
schools.‖ Id. Yet the federal government deemed the charter worthy of $600,000 in funding 
based entirely on the school’s application. That application seems to have included a variety of 
serious misrepresentations. Id. 
 160. See supra note 154 and accompanying text. 
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segregation. Our federal government spends, with no concern that it 
finances segregation. 
In fact, the federal government is actually promoting segregation 
when it advocates charter schools as a way to help failing school 
districts and at-risk students. In our country, this focus too often 
means poor and/or minority school children. These children certainly 
need and deserve better educational offerings supported by the 
federal government. But by offering charter schools as a solution to 
the plight of at-risk children in failing school districts, we will too 
often concentrate them again in segregated educational environments. 
If charter schools had a consistent record of improved educational 
outcomes, I could see how this focus on charter schools could make 
sense. But charter schools have a mixed academic record.
161
 And 
although the academic literature exhibits many disagreements, 
everyone agrees that high-poverty schools, whether traditional or 
charter, are the hardest to operate successfully.
162
 Federal funding to 
increase their number—by advocating charter schools as a better 
alternative for education—is ludicrous. 
In addition, to operate charter schools for the advantage of at-risk 
children requires that those typically with the fewest resources—poor 
parents—make the ―right‖ choices to improve their children’s 
education.
163
 While parents rightly desire options other than failing 
traditional schools, I fail to see how placing so much responsibility 
on poor parents will ensure success. This is particularly so given the 
lack of choices currently available in charter schools. 
At the very least, the federal government should condition the 
awarding of money on a charter school’s inclusion of ―deliberate 
integration dimensions.‖164 Without that component, charter schools 
become a twenty-first century version of freedom-of-choice plans 
that locked in de jure segregation—but worse: charter schools too 
often offer exclusively segregative educational experiences while the 
freedom-of-choice plans at least offered some degree of demographic 
 
 161. See supra notes 43–44 and accompanying text. 
 162. See RYAN, supra note 5, at 277–78; Parker, The Failure of Education Reform, supra 
note 13, at 409–11. 
 163. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
 164. Minow, supra note 24, at 817. 
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choice.
165
 Requiring charter schools to at a minimum pay attention to 
integration would necessarily entail an end to federal funding of 
special-identity charter schools. The federal government should not 
be in the business of financing schools explicitly designed to 
segregate.  
The academic literature is very clear: integrated schools, 
particularly ones integrated by class, are much more likely to be 
successful than economically or racially segregated schools.
166
 For 
that reason alone, the federal government should once again embrace 
integration.
167
  
CONCLUSION 
By its terms, choice has great appeal.
168
 As a society we need, 
however, leadership to determine what kinds of choices we should 
offer, at public expense, to parents. 
Charter schools too often separate out children who have the 
highest need for quality education into their separate schools, when 
the evidence is strikingly strong that these schools are too often 
doomed to failure. We cannot continue to design, operate, and fund 
charter schools that are returning us to the days of legal segregation. 
 
 165. See supra Part II.C. 
 166. See RYAN, supra note 5, at 277–78; Parker, The Failure of Education Reform, supra 
note 13, at 407–11. 
 167. For details on how the Executive Branch of the federal government championed the 
mandates of the Civil Rights Act in the 1960s and 1970s, see Parker, Connecting the Dots, 
supra note 22, at 1720–22. The Clinton Administration took a stronger approach to promoting 
diversity in charter schools than the current administration. In 2000, Clinton’s Department of 
Education issued a statement urging charter schools to recruit students from a diverse 
background. See Applying Federal Civil Rights Laws to Public Charter Schools, U.S. DEP’T OF 
EDUC., http://www2.ed.gov/offices/OCR/archives/charterqa/charorder.html (last visited Aug. 
24, 2012) (asserting that if a charter school is located in a district with a desegregation plan or 
court order, the charter school must also comply with that plan or court order and detailing 
when and how the school must comply). That statement, archived by the Bush Administration, 
should at the very least be reissued by the Obama Administration.  
 168. Dean Minow makes the point that ―[s]chool choice resonates with the liberal value of 
autonomy and the market conception of consumer sovereignty.‖ Minow, supra note 24, at 817. 
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